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Rule of Law Symposium
Gender and the Rule of Law in
Transitional Societies
Fionnuala Ni Aoldin & Michael Hamilton*
Dominant hierarchies ... often marginalize women's priorities, interests,
and participation ... in fact, they render invisible the gendered patterns
and structures .... In many cases, this invisibility is shaped and enabled
by background social structures and ideologies, including discrimination
embedded in the legal system, the dearth of women in the political sphere,
barriers to women's access to the media .... These social norms,
ideologies, practices, and institutional arrangements characterize contexts
of war, but also peace.I
This article examines a unique relationship-specifically,
the connection between the rule of law, as it is imported and
experienced in post-conflict/post-repression societies, and
gender. We assert that some of the most gendered and
problematic dimensions of rule of law discourse and practice can
arise with intensity in post-conflict or post-repressive societies.
In particular, we explore a fundamental contradiction.
Transitional societies bring powerful and transformative
moments to global attention. The rule of law movement gains
cachet from being a defining and motivating cog in that
transitional process. Yet such transformation can be selective,
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1. VASUKI NESIAH ET AL., INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, TRUTH
COMMISSIONS AND GENDER: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 43-44 (2006).
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both in its spheres of influence and in its masculinity. While
transformation may occur, the pivotal question we raise is for
whom?
Clearly, there is a need for further empirical research
mapping causality between rule of law initiatives and gender-
oriented goals (noting the methodological challenges presented
by measuring rule of law gains or losses).2 Our aim here is to
begin to articulate this research agenda. We suggest that what
may appear to be a moment of opportunity can become a
moment of retrenchment. Such retrenchment, at least from a
feminist perspective, is arguably located in the core
private/public division that accompanies the rule of law in
theory and practice. Moreover, despite substantive advances in
dismantling the public/private divide in many western societies,
we argue that those same western states-in part, through rule
of law proselytizing-can entrench the operation of this divide
in transitional states.
I. RULE OF LAW, NOT OF MEN?3
In a well known article, Thomas Carothers noted that
"western policy makers and commentators have seized upon
[the rule of law] as an elixir for countries in transition."4
2. Katharina Pistor, Launching a Global Rule of Law Movement: Next Steps
November 10, 2005, 25 BERKELEY J. INT'L LAW 100, 103 (2007) (arguing that
indicators need to be developed that are capable of measuring processes not merely
technocratic outcomes); see also Katharina Pistor et al., Social Norms, Rule of Law,
and Gender Reality (ABA World Justice Project, Prepared for World Justice Forum,
Vienna, 2008) available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/pdf/20080806040428_large.pdf. Pistor,
Haldar, and Amirapu note, inter alia, that data for many variables (such as
confidence in the judiciary) is only available for Western European countries, id. at
14, n.17, and that the quality of CEDAW Country Reports is uneven and thus "not
usable for this kind of analysis," id. at 23.
3. As Margaret Jane Radin has noted, "when the ideal [of the rule of law]
developed, and during most of its long history, it was inconceivable that any
individuals who were not 'men' could be a part of political life." Margaret Jane
Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 781 n.1 (1989).
4. Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 95, 99
(1998). See, more recently, Thomas Carothers, Rule of Law Temptations (ABA World
Justice Project, Prepared for World Justice Forum, Vienna, 2008) available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/pdf/2008080603365 1-large.pdf. Carothers
warns that the concept is "so capacious that it is open to significantly different
interpretations and operational emphasis," id. at 3, and that therefore "international
attention to the rule of law is arguably as much about the fraying of an international
consensus on political values as convergence," id. at 4. See generally Rosa
Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the "Rule of Law'"
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However, while variously lauded as the "signal virtue of
civilized societies"5 and "an unqualified human good,"6 the goals
of rule of law reform are often unclear. Indeed, David Chandler
asks whether the rule of law is a prerequisite to a successful
transition or the consequence of it?7 This raises the deeper
underlying question of whether law's role is ever anything more
than epiphenomenal-specifically, here, in terms of expanding
the possibilities for gender justice.8  This polemic raises
significantly broader questions than those addressed here, but
its underlying challenge is fundamental not merely in terms of
the sequencing of transformation but also in terms of assessing
its depth. As Pistor, Haldar and Amirapu argue, "reliance on the
rule of law as the harbinger of greater gender equality might be
over-optimistic, if not misleading."9
In crude terms, the "rule of law" is an assertion of law's
preeminence-its autonomy from and superiority to fallible
politics. On this basis, Rajagopal suggests that enthusiasm for
the rule of law by development experts, security analysts, and
human rights activists is driven by "a desire to escape from
politics by imagining the rule of law as technical, legal, and
apolitical."'" This caricature, however, not only underplays the
complexity of modern governance and administrative
regulation-it represents merely the ego-image of its most
101 MICH. L. REV. 2275, 2275 (2003) (describing the "explosion in 'rule of law'
promotion," noting "a string of expensive disappointments," and asking "what's gone
wrong?"); Celestine Nyamu-Musembi, Ruling Out Gender Equality? The Post-Cold
War Rule of Law Agenda in Sub-Saharan Africa, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 1193 (2006)
(asserting that post-Cold War rule of law efforts in sub-Saharan Africa have focused
on improving the market rather than gender equality).
5. NEIL MACCORMICK, RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW: A THEORY OF LEGAL
REASONING 12 (Oxford Univ. Press 2005).
6. E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGINS OF THE BLACK ACT 266
(Pantheon Books 1975).
7. See DAVID CHANDLER, BOSNIA: FAKING DEMOCRACY AFTER DAYTON 12-13
(Pluto Press 2d ed. 1999) (citing Richard Rose, Where are Post Communist Countries
Going?, 8 J. DEMOCRACY 92, 97 (1997)); see also Carothers, Rule of Law Temptations,
supra note 4, at 5-6 (addressing "sequentialism").
8. Compare for example, Nonet and Selznick's sociological approach to law,
which describes the ideal of "responsive law" as "a facilitator of response to social
needs and aspirations." PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN
TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW 14-15 (Octagon Books 1978). See also Pistor
et al., supra note 2, at 24 (suggesting that legal change merely follows and reflects
prior transformation in cultural and social norms).
9. Pistor et al., supra note 2, at 24.
10. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Invoking the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict
Rebuilding: A Critical Examination, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1347, 1349 (2007).
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ardent proponents." Worse still, the rule of law industry's
global ambition is motivated in part by its profit potential. 2
Nonetheless, (whether despite, or because of, these dynamics)
the rule of law has become integral to the aesthetics and
cartography of "transition".3
MINIMAL IMPORT VERSUS MAXIMAL POTENTIAL
The "rule of law" can be distinguished from what Duncan
Ivison terms "negative constitutionalism" or rule by law.'4
Beyond this distinction, however, thin, minimalist, formal or
procedural rule of law theories are often contrasted with thick,
maximalist, or substantive theories. The former-focusing on
qualities such as openness, impartiality, certainty, and
prospectivity-are rarely disputed as being key to law's capacity
to stabilize behavioral expectations, and thus create a baseline
for reciprocal interaction and conduct.'5 Such qualities are
evidently central to the rehabilitation of law in conflicted or
repressive societies. Our primary concern, however, is with the
normative import of "rule of law" discourse: the world it
11. See, e.g., Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule of Law Orthodoxy 7, 14-
20 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Rule of Law Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 30, 2002) available at
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/wp30.pdf.
12. Launching a world-wide campaign to promote the rule of law in September
2005, then-President of the International Bar Association (IBA), Francis Neate,
declared:
We lawyers have a duty, as well as an interest, to respond. Business can
only flourish when there is adherence to the Rule of Law. Without it,
freedom and democracy cannot exist. Nor can lawyers. We lawyers
understand what the Rule of Law means-why it is important-how it
works.
HANS CORELL, CREATING A GLOBAL RULE OF LAW MEETING POINT 4 (2007),
http://www.havc.se/res/SelectedMaterial/20080129hiil2007annualhiilconference.pdf.
13. See generally The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on
the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies,
U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004).
14. Duncan Ivison, Pluralism and the Hobbesian Logic of Negative
Constitutionalism, 47 POL. STUD. 83, 83-89 (1999).
15. See JOSEPH RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY
214-18 (Oxford Univ. Press 1979). Premised on the notion that "the law must be
capable of guiding the behaviour of its subjects," Raz argues that the law must be
prospective, open, clear, and relatively stable. Id. at 214. In addition, the
independence of the judiciary, adherence to the principles of natural justice
(particularly in guaranteeing open and fair hearings), the power of the courts to
review the implementation of these principles, and the accessibility of the courts
must all be ensured, and "[t]he discretion of crime-preventing agencies should not be
allowed to pervert the law." Id. at 218.
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constructs and engenders 6 and the enabling conditions which
can help make rule of law reform meaningful. 7
Perhaps what minimalist conceptions of the rule of law
usefully teach is the need to temper our expectations of what
law can achieve. While, for example, it is certainly one of the
principal functions of law to place restrictions on the free use of
violence," a minimalist conception of the rule of law views law
as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a fully just legal
polity-"[t]he legal system is only part of the norms constituting
the political system .". ."" As H.L.A. Hart argues, it is the
"insistence on importance or seriousness of social pressure
behind the rules" that "is the primary factor determining
whether they are thought of as giving rise to obligations."2 This
chimes with Joma Nazpary's account of increasing public
violence against young women in post-Soviet Kazakhstan:
The public violence against women is legitimised by ... [the
prevailing] morality .... According to such morality a woman who
breaks the moral codes on sexuality, dresses improperly, visits
inappropriate places and breaks the gendered rules of time, invites
such violence on herself. Moreover, she is depicted as a pervert who
must be disciplined or eliminated. This results in the absence of any
social pressure on the police and judicial systems, dominated by
powerful men, to give any protection to women in public.
2 1
In a similar vein, Lynne Henderson notes that "a
jurisprudential preoccupation with the duty to obey law and the
16. See, e.g., Guyora Binder & Robert Weisberg, Cultural Criticism of Law, 49
STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1155 (1997) (noting that "we 'read' our social surroundings with
the help of familiar plots, characters and sensibilities"). In this way, deeply
entrenched notions of gender roles and gender security play a formative and under-
recognized role in framing social surroundings in the transitional landscape.
17. See Carothers, Rule of Law Revival, supra note 4, at 99-100; see also David
Tolbert & Andrew Solomon, United Nations Reform and Supporting the Rule of Law
in Post-Conflict Societies, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 29, 30 (2006) (arguing that "to give
effect to the rule of law, these societies must address the crimes committed during
the conflict, create sound legal infrastructure, and build functioning institutions");
Upham, supra note 11, at 33 ("Legal anarchy can result in a society that has a new,
formal legal system but lacks the social capital, institutions, and discipline to make
use of it.").
18. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 91 (2d ed. 1994). Similarly, Tony
Honor6 views the normative force of law in its capacity "to supplant unregulated
violence, both within societies and between them, by fostering the values of co-
operation and peaceful co-existence." Tony HonorS, The Necessary Connection
Between Law and Morality, 22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 489, 492 (2002).
19. RAZ, supra note 15, at 100.
20. HART, supra note 18, at 87.
21. JOMA NAZPARY, POST-SOVIET CHAOS: VIOLENCE AND DISPOSSESSION IN
KAZAKHSTAN 126 (2002) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 18:2
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authority of law overlooks law's tendency to validate and
facilitate oppression and violence, whether by the state directly
or by private actors with tacit state approval."22 This systematic
pattern illustrates the barriers faced and the extent to which a
more somber set of expectations concerning the rule of law's
impact might strengthen rather than weaken women's
positions. However, we also suggest that elevating as virtuous
only those values which cohere with a minimal conception of the
rule of law can negatively impact the advancement of
substantive gender goals in at least three ways.
First, formal or procedural understandings of the rule of
law contain an implicitly conservative bias. The rule of law is
viewed as generally unconcerned with the content of rules, and
is therefore, as Raz puts it, "compatible with gross violations of
human rights."23 As such, the rule of law agenda does not lend
itself to resisting values embodied by the State, and its
transformative reach is inherently stunted. In this light, rule of
law-infused transitions can arguably sustain, without
contradiction, persistent discrimination against women,
systematic and normalized private violence, and immovable
barriers to equality in the public sphere. Notably, Rajagopal
has suggested that such formal understandings are in part
responsible for the contemporary preference for "rule of law"
over "human rights" discourses:
The rule of law came to be seen, in many ways, as a convenient
substitute for human rights. Unlike human rights, the rule of law
does not promise the achievement of any substantive social, political,
or cultural goal. It is much more empty of content and capable of being
interpreted in many diverse, sometimes contradictory, ways. The
human rights discourse is a discourse of social transformation, and
even emancipation, whereas the rule of law discourse does not have
that ambition and may be seen as inherently conservative.
24
22. Lynne Henderson, Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law, 66 IND. L.J. 379,
383 (1991). An example of the dangers of a jurisprudential preoccupation with the
duty to obey law is seen in the United States' "long history of governmental
tolerance of private oppression of women and children through violence." Id.
23. RAZ, supra note 15, at 221.
24. Rajagopal, supra note 10, at 1359. Costas Douzinas advances this position
further and attests to the implicit open-endedness of the human rights paradigm:
[While the rule of law implies the possibility of opposing right to power, a
human rights polity goes much further: it tests and accepts rights that
have not yet been established, its logic extends into areas of activity the
state cannot entirely master and its limits remain open to further
contestation and expansion.
COSTAS DOUZINAS, THE END OF HUMAN RIGHTS: CRITIcAL LEGAL THOUGHT AT THE
20091
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Self-evidently, when one takes onboard an international
human rights law corpus which includes the pivotal Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, some legal frames may hold significantly better
outcomes for women than others. We accept that the distance
between "rule of law" and "human rights" discourses is reduced
when thicker understandings of the rule of law are invoked
(notwithstanding also that human rights rhetoric can equally
shortchange substantive gender goals).25  Nonetheless, the
essential point is a cogent one-that rule of law frames for
transitional societies offer potentially splintered and pared-
down transformation, but in the guise of substantive change.
One way to articulate this difference may be to distinguish
between reform and transformation. Both offer movement
forward from the status quo, which in deeply conflicted or
violent societies is a positive outcome when mass atrocity,
undeniable suffering, and uncontrollable violence are all
variously at play.26  But for those stakeholders who seek
transformative change, the rule of law paradigm may always
fall short. 7
Second, and following from its inherent conservatism, rule
of law formalism-as "universal rules uniformly applied"2 -
entrenches the invisibility of the private sphere through its
implicit orientation towards the value of autonomy. The equal
TURN OF THE CENTURY 171 (2000).
25. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Political Judges and the Rule of Law, 64 PROC.
OF THE BRIT. ACAD. 259, 262 (1978) (discussing a substantive rule of law theory that
makes questions of justice directly relevant to questions of law and "is the ideal of
rule by an accurate public conception of individual rights").
26. See generally Heinz Klug, Transnational Human Rights: Exploring the
Persistence and Globalization of Human Rights, 1 ANN. REV. L. Soc. Sci. 85, 96-97
(2005) (noting the rise of world constitutionalism, but arguing that "the jury is still
out when it comes to judging either the meaningful implementation or effectiveness
of these new institutions").
27. See, e.g., Carothers, Rule of Law Temptations, supra note 4, at 7.
What Western policy makers and political observers are overlooking in
their enthusiasm for the rule of law as a response to troubled transitions is
that movement from a state of weak or absent rule of law to the
achievement of the rule of law involves far more than getting judges
trained, putting modern police equipment in place, and re-printing and
distributing legal texts. It is a transformative process that changes how
power is both exercised and distributed in a society and thus a process
inherently threatening to existing power holders. It also involves basic
changes in how citizens relate to state authority and also to each other.
Id.
28. Upham, supra note 11, at 14.
[Vol. 18:2
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application of universal rules conceives of law's subjects, to
borrow from Alan Norrie, as "abstractions from real people
emphasising one side of human life-the ability to reason and
calculate-at the expense of every social circumstance that
actually brings individuals to reason and calculate in particular
ways."29 Law thus does not recognize the gendered subject as
different but seeks instead merely to guarantee a level of
individual autonomy from interference by the State or from
others."
Accepting that dichotomies of sameness and difference
provoke their own reactions from feminist scholars, we
nonetheless hold that the inability to structurally acknowledge
and address the compounded exclusions and harms experienced
by women in transitional societies means that they are
implicitly disadvantaged by the status of the autonomy value.
Elevating minimalist rule of law values can therefore sustain a
public/private divide in which (domestic and international) law's
"proper" role is merely to police the boundaries between
autonomous, self-regulating individuals. As Hilary
Charlesworth has aptly noted, "[h]istorically, the formation of
the state depended on a sexual division of labor and the
relegation of women to a private, domestic, devalued sphere.
Men dominated in the public sphere of citizenship and political
and economic life."'" The creation and maintenance of these
29. ALAN NORRIE, CRIME, REASON AND HISTORY 23 (1993), cited in DOUZINAS,
supra note 24, at 237-38.
30. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law in Contemporary Liberal
Theory, 2 RATIO JURIS 79, 84-85 (1989) (contrasting Rawls's, Nozick's and Raz's
conceptions of autonomy); see also Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the
Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307, 1322 (2001). The
question often addressed in feminist legal theory-and social and political
philosophy more generally-is whether, in order to flourish, the human condition
requires autonomy and independence or community and connectedness. See, e.g.,
Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 52 (1988) (suggesting
that the rule of law implicitly reflects this antinomy); see also Christine Sypnowich,
Utopia and the Rule of Law, in RECRAFTING THE RULE OF LAW: THE LIMITS OF LEGAL
ORDER 179, 184-87 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 1999). We think it useful to recall Axel
Honneth's argument that both autonomy and community are necessary as
recognizing the (gendered) person's equal legal status, and their differentiated,
desirous, individuality. See AXEL HONNETH, THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION: THE
MORAL GRAMMAR OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS (Joel Anderson trans., 1995). As
MacCormick puts it, we are at once "independent though interdependent
participants in public and private activities in a society." MACCORMICK, supra note
5, at 16.
31. Hilary Charlesworth, Alienating Oscar? Feminist Analysis of International
Law, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 9-10 (Dorinda
G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993).
2009]
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
boundaries has been facilitated and legitimized by a rule of law
discourse, within which presumed neutrality is a central plank.
The implications for women of the public/private divide
have been well documented by feminist scholars over the
decades.32 Law's oversight of the private domain is purposely
constrained, and it remains effectively outside the bounds of
regulation. This, in turn, ultimately translates into structured
inequality and exclusions being validated to the social, legal and
economic detriment of women. We argue that this rule of law
blind spot becomes particularly manifest in transitional reform
initiatives. The nub surprisingly is that despite inroads made
on the public/private division in many western democracies, its
reestablishment in the context of transitional societies
represents a marked feature of the rule of law paradigm. "New
beginnings" can paradoxically facilitate a retreat to the private
domain whilst celebrating the reconfiguration of the public. As
discussed further below, a key element in this matrix is the
international community's demand for the rule of law. There is
increasing evidence that transitions with thin conceptions of the
rule of law produce adverse or limited gender outcomes.
Moreover, given the inherent rule of law biases outlined above,
it is not clear that substantive rule of law application
fundamentally changes outcomes for women.
The third potential consequence of elevating rule of law
formalism is that in the desire to "reestablish normality" during
the transitionary period or to enhance the legitimacy of legal
transplants,33 rule of law interventions may actually encourage
and reify "traditional" cultural practices and structures that are
ultimately harmful to women or that re-entrench women's prior
exclusion. Ironically, it is often the reality of conflict and/or
repression in a society-rather than any rule of law
intervention-that operates to disrupt or unseat the entrenched
32. Feminist theorists have long articulated that the most pervasive harms to
women tend to occur within the inner sanctum of the private realm, within the
family. For a fascinating recent contribution, see SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN
RIGHTS & GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL
JUSTICE (2006).
33. We recall here William Twining's important evaluation of legal diffusion.
Twining usefully identifies a naive model of diffusion, which lacks appreciation for
the cultural and social content into which legal norms will be adopted. See William
Twining, Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective, 49 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (2004).
Suffice to note that the inability to read the cultural effect of deep-seated gender
stereotypes and discrimination on "neutral" rule of law values may itself be a clue to
the fundamental failure of the discourse to engage with the lived social realities of
women's lives in transitional societies.
[Vol. 18:2
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social order (including its gendered cultural practices). In other
words, the flux of a disrupted society may offer to some women
increased equality, social mobility, and an opportunity to
challenge structured gender roles. We do not suggest this to be
true for all conflicted or repressive societies, nor for all women
in such contexts. We do, though, suggest that the observation
holds true across a number of societal contexts. When flux
produces significant social shifts, law is generally marginalized
in the process. But counter-intuitively, efforts to reestablish
law's centrality and legitimacy may actually be counter-
productive for women. In play for some societies is the brutal
reality that family and private life has been severely
compromised and assailed by the prior regime. There is an
instinctual reflex to reaffirm and secure these private spaces as
part of delineating the old from the new. The dangers for
gendered retrenchment are rarely perceived. The fatal blow to
change may arise, paradoxically, at the very point of transition
when both insider and outsider elites hearken back to the
security offered by established cultural practices as a way of
reinventing and securing the new order. In this move, the rule
of law becomes complicit in supporting the culturally relativist
position, by failing to fully read the regression in the transition.
II. GENDER AND RULE OF LAW FLASHPOINTS
While we do not eschew the potential for embedded rule of
law initiatives to render visible or give legal expression to
gendered harms,34 our concern is that the rule of law's glossy
appeal can blind us to its negative edge, and in particular,
obscure the implicit and explicit masculinity of its purchase. To
interrogate this claim further, the following section adopts
Carothers's distinction between three levels of rule of law
reform: first, a focus on laws themselves (e.g. criminal,
commercial, or administrative law reforms); second, reform of
legal institutions (focused primarily on improving competencies,
efficiency, and accountability); third, ensuring greater
34. Sypnowich, for example, suggests that arguments that easily dismiss the
rule of law are often characterized by "naivete about the kinds of social relations
that would obtain in its absence." Sypnowich, supra note 30, at 185-86. Similarly,
Brian Tamanaha takes a potshot at critical legal deconstructionists who attack
"liberalism and the rule of law without proposing what should supplant them."
BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 85-86
(2004).
2009]
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
government conformity to rule of law (with an emphasis on
judicial independence and the ethos and values of governance).35
In all three spheres there are gendered implications that
accompany the framing at play, all reflecting an implicit bias to
the public sphere,36 and all invariably advanced and negotiated
without significant involvement or inclusion for women.
A. LAWS AND LEGISLATION
The ordering of law reform priorities reveals preferences for
modifications that rarely impinge upon those legal strictures
that most limit women's equality and protection in conflicted or
repressive societies. Thus commercial rules frequently emerge
ascendant; it is no accident that such reforms facilitate the
opening up and functioning of markets.37  Criminal
accountability is frequently at the forefront of the rule of law
project, and we concur that for societies that have experienced
repression and violence accountability is a priority.
Nonetheless, as one author of this Article has explored
elsewhere, accountability is selective and decidedly gendered,
exposing the limited willingness and capacity to address the full
range of harms experienced by women in these societies.3 8
Criminal prosecutions generally emerge for a narrow range of
sexual violations, and the dearth of prosecution sought and
successfully achieved is striking. Administrative law reforms
rarely engage wholesale with the private sphere and generally
strike Faustian bargains with religious institutions, which oust
from the regulatory frame those matters which affect the
private lives of women and their capacity to participate
meaningfully in the public spheres. The exclusions range from
contract reform, inheritance, property ownership, divorce, and a
range of legal status matters.39 All of these significantly impact
the legal opportunity structures for women."a Moreover, as
35. Carothers, Rule of Law Revival, supra note 4, at 99-100.
36. See generally Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schnedier, Women's
Subordination and the Role of Law, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (D. Kelly Weisberg
ed., 1993).
37. See Nyamu-Musembi, supra note 4.
38. See generally Fionnuala Ni Aoldin & Catherine Turner, Gender, Truth and
Transition, 16 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 16 (2007).
39. See generally ENGLE MERRY, supra note 32; Nyamu-Musembi, supra note 4.
40. The concept of "legal opportunity structures" borrows from that of "political
opportunity structures" in social movement theory, and describes the constraints
and incentives that operate on particular (here, gendered) actors at a given time vis-
A-vis their interaction with legal institutions. See generally Chris Hilson, New
[Vol. 18:2
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Pistor, Haldar and Amirapu note in relation to their Indian case
study:
It is evident from the account provided that law in India is honored
more in the breach than in the observance. Despite an elaborate array
of legal guarantees, women's rights in India have consistently and
blatantly been violated suggesting that the mere existence of law does
not tell us anything about its impact.
41
B. INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
Reform of legal and related institutions is a high priority,
but it is decidedly gendered. A cogent example lies in the
security sector reform (SSR) context, where police and military
transformation emerge as political mantras signaling a break
with the past and necessary elements of legal legitimacy.42
Security sector reform is fraught with gendered pitfalls.43 The
central weakness is the starting point that essentializes security
with particular forms of physical violence to the person and in
the transitional context ignores a much wider range of
institutional and structural elements that may cause greater
"harms" to society as a whole and to women in particular.44 For
many women the relationship between the physical violence
experienced during conflict or repression (noting that term will
be broadly understood) and the security of the post-conflict
environment are not discontinuous realities but rather part of
one singular experience that is not compartmentalized. A focal
point of the feminist critique on security sector reform is
challenging the dominant view that the function of security
sector reform for the state is to reassert its full control and
Social Movements: The Role of Legal Opportunity, 9 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 238 (2002);
Bruce M. Wilson & Juan Carlos Rodriguez Cordero, Legal Opportunity Structures
and Social Movements: The Effects of Institutional Change on Costa Rican Politics,
39 COMP. POL. STUD. 325 (2006).
41. Pistor et al., supra note 2, at 21-22.
42. See JANE STROMSETH, DAVID WIPPMAN & ROSA BROOKS, CAN MIGHT MAKE
RIGHTS?: BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 202-26
(2006).
43. See generally T. Winkler, Managing Change: The Reform and Democratic
Control of the Security Sector and International Order (Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, Occasional Paper No. 1, 2002) available at
http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/wit04/witO4.pdf. For an analysis of the weakness of the
concept of security and the gendered nature of security sector reform, see Fionnuala
Ni Aoldin, Gender, Security, and the Patriarchy of Internationalized Transitional
Justice, HUM. RTS. Q. (forthcoming 2009).
44. See generally Fionnuala Ni Aoliin, Political Violence and Gender During
Times of Transition, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 829 (2006).
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authority over the exercise of force.45  One aspect of this
approach links security sector reform (whether in democratic or
non-democratic contexts) to funneling the security sector "back"
to civilian and democratic control. It is important to stress the
extent to which that widespread debate (with significant
legitimacy among international states and institutions) fails to
engage with the patriarchies and exclusions that are reinforced
(and/or invented) to re-exercise that form of control. 6 Thus, the
'reformist' mode of security sector reform contains an explicit
modeling on western security sector organization with a
compelling blind-spot about the gender distortions inherent in
these institutions and their subsequent export to other states.
A second aspect of institutional reform in transitional
societies concerns recourse to both informal and traditional
justice mechanisms. Here, it is apt to recall our earlier point
about the potential for rule of law programs to defer to
established cultural practices-either in a bid to gain legitimacy
or to 're-establish normality'. Upham, for example, argues that
one significant "cost of importing a formalist legal system. . is
the risk to existing informal means of social order, without
which no legal system can succeed."47  Yet existing informal
means of social order may equally pose risks for women and
sexual minorities. For example, restorative justice has emerged
as an increasingly visible alternative to traditional punitive
justice applied during and after conflict, as well as in
peacetime.48 It has received considerable endorsement from
45. Fionnuala Ni Aoldin, Women, Security and the Patriarchy of
Internationalized Transitional Justice, HUM. RTS. Q. (forthcoming 2009).
46. An example of this is found in a challenging review by the Bonn
International Center for Conversion entitled Voice and Accountability in the Security
Sector. NICOLE BALL ET AL., BONN INT'L CTR. FOR CONVERSION, VOICE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE SECURITY SECTOR (2002),
http://www.bicc.de/publications/papers/paper21/paper21.pdf. Here there is a positive
and indeed progressive emphasis on the relationship between security and poverty.
The report highlights the way in which poor people experience ill-security far more
frequently and negatively. However, there is almost no disaggregation of the
gendered nature of poverty in most societies, nor is there a link made between
"intimate" violence, poverty, gender, and security reform. Another clear bias in the
report is the use of the term "victim," stressing at the outset that "[a]lthough men
are more frequently the victims of wars and violent crime, modern war is
increasingly deadly for women and children .... " Id. at 3. Again, here there is a
lack of critical analysis around what hierarchies of victims are constructed and how
women are often categorized in the secondary rather than the primary categories of
victimhood.
47. Upham, supra note 11, at 32.
48. See generally HANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
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international institutions and states supporting conflict
transition as a low-cost, high-yield mechanism to address
systematic violations of human rights. These kinds of
restorative processes advocate a prominent role for the survivor,
place emphasis on accountability in a broad sense rather than
on punishment, and urge the reintegration of perpetrators back
into the communal context.
Restorative justice gets some of its traction from the view
that as a result of a degradation of confidence in the rule of law
generally, and/or in the enforcers of law during a conflict, formal
processes are not appropriate to re-imagining legal enforcement
in deeply rifted societies. Thus, restorative justice measures
have emerged as highly developed and imaginative responses
from academics and policy makers who view it as a means to
address regulatory lacunae with particular groups, or to address
lacunae in policing and criminal justice in divided societies.49
While not seeking to devalue the contribution of restorative
justice approaches to fraught rule of law restoration and
processes of reconciliation generally, we think it necessary to
address the shortcomings of restorative justice when applied to
gender. These include the inherent pitfalls of using such
mechanisms to address intimate sexual violation," the seepage
of communally based and politically contingent gender
inequalities into both the form and outcomes of proceedings,51
the limitations on women playing adjudicative roles, and the
lack of psychological or financial reparation given to buttress
informal mechanisms.
In addition to informal justice mechanisms, as Salter and
Huyse so cogently outline, tradition-based systems of dispute
resolution are usually male-dominated and favor patriarchal
(Dennis Sullivan & Larry Tift eds., 2005); Clara Chapdelaine Feliciati, Restorative
Justice for the Girl Child in Post-Conflict Rwanda, 7 J. INT'L WOMEN'S STUD. 14
(2006); Jennifer Llewellyn & Robert Howse, Institutions for Restorative Justice: The
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 49 U. TORONTO L. J. 355
(1999).
49. See, e.g., CRIMINOLOGY, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
(Kieran McEvoy & Tim Newburn eds., 2003).
50. See, for example, Sally Engle Merry's discussion of the CEDAW hearings in
January 2002 relating to recourse to bulubulu in rape cases. ENGLE MERRY, supra
note 32, at 113-33. Bulubulu is a Fijian customary practice involving an apology, an
offer of a whale's tooth, a gift, and a request for forgiveness. Id.
51. See, for example, Mark Drumbl's discussion the Pashtunwali in
Afghanistan. Mark A. Drumbl, Rights, Culture, and Crime: The Role of Rule of Law
for the Women of Afghanistan, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 349, 381-87 (2004).
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outcomes. 2  Citing Victor Igreja's critique of traditional
mechanisms of accountability in Mozambique, where the gender
bias in the content of gamba is especially pronounced, they note:
[T]he women killed during the Mozambican civil war are unable to
return as spirits to the realm of the living to claim justice. Only the
spirits of men can do this. In this sense, although magamba spirits
break with the silence of the past, structurally the justice they offer
helps to reinforce patriarchical power in a country that is struggling
for gender equality.
5 3
Salter and Huyse's edited collection documents a number of
similar stories of women's exclusion from traditional
mechanisms. Naniwe-Kaburahe's case study on the institution
of bashingantahe in Burundi,54 for example, reveals that despite
its many attractions,55 a woman has no place in the institution's
deliberations except through her status as wife or widow. 6
Moreover, as Salter and Huyse note, "efforts to increase the
participation of women are being held up by the conservative
reflexes of men."57 This pattern is evident across jurisdictions
and affirms the core argument made here that the rule of law
discourse may do little (and may not be intended) to undo these
structural biases and in a number of contexts has served to
validate and entrench them.
C. GOOD GOVERNANCE AND THE RULE OF LAW
Finally, some caution regarding governance reform. As
Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz argue, "[n]orms of governance
prescribe desirable modes of wielding power-physical, political,
economic, or other."58 While good governance can only prevail
where the rule of law exists, rule of law initiatives equally rely
on the prescription of governance norms which secure adequate
representation of women (in relation both to their design and
52. TRADITIONAL. JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT:
LEARNING FROM AFRICAN EXPERIENCES 183-84 (Luc Huyse & Mark Salter eds.,
2008).
53. Id. at 80.
54. The term bashingatahe "refers to men of integrity who are responsible for
settling conflicts at all levels." Id. at 154.
55. Id. at 165.
56. Id. at 167.
57. Id. at 184.
58. Amir N. Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt & Shalom H. Schwartz, Culture Rules:
The Foundations of the Rule of Law and Other Norms of Governance, 35 J. COMP.
ECON. 659, 659 (2007).
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implementation).5 9
Women's access to structures of power was a central strand
in the Beijing Platform of Action.6" Yet, while elections,
transparency, oversight, and ethical reforms are valuable
additions to state reform efforts, it should not be presumed that
these neutralizing additions to dysfunctional political systems
will, of themselves, produce gender-friendly outcomes. Rather,
their contribution may create one version of a level playing field
which facilitates greater inclusion for a diverse and
representative group of elite men, rather than opening up the
domain itself to women. Consequently, for example, there has
been much debate about the desirability of women's quotas on
candidate lists and the issue of training and capacity building
amongst prospective candidates.6 ' The same dynamics may be
seen with respect to judicial reform.
We must remain alert to the potential for "unruly
practices," "bureaucratic inertia and insufficient resources" to
subvert otherwise progressive governance reforms.6 2 "Because of
entrenched gender biases, women working in state
bureaucracies to promote gender interests find themselves in an
ambivalent position working both 'within and against' the
state."63
It would be disingenuous to ignore the substantial
international institutional work that has been undertaken to
mainstream and address the role of women in transitional
contexts. Relevant to this preliminary assessment are the
Office of the High Commission on Human Rights' Rule-of-Law
Tools for Post-Conflict States.64 These reports cover a range of
59. "The marginalisation of women in the political process and governance in
general has been both the cause and effect of the slow progress made in the
advancement of women." UNDP, WOMEN AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND GOOD
GOVERNANCE: 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES iii (2000). See also CHANDLER, supra note
7, and Carothers, Rule of Law Temptations, supra note 4, at 5-6, with regard to the
question of "sequencing."
60. Fourth World Conference on Women, Sept. 4th-15th, 1995, Beijing
Declaration and Platform for Action, AICONF.177/20 (Oct. 17, 1995) &
A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 (Oct. 27, 1995).
61. See, e.g., Elaine Zuckerman & Marcia Greenberg, The Gender Dimensions
of Post-Conflict Reconstruction: An Analytical Framework For Policymakers, 12
GENDER & DEVELOPMENT 70, 71 (2004) (contrasting the approach to quotas adopted
in South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia, Kosovo and Timor-Leste).
62. See UNDP, supra note 59, at 31. The concept of "unruly practices" refers to
"formal or informal decisions that subvert norms or established rules."
63. Id.
64. OHCHR, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Reparations
Programmes, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/08/1 (2008).
2009] 395
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
areas-truth commissions, prosecution initiatives, vetting,
mapping the justice sector, the legacy of hybrid courts,
monitoring legal systems, and reparations programs. With
regards to the latter, for example, the report argues that newly
established reparations mechanisms should afford women
significant input into identifying the rights which would trigger
reparative benefits, allow for more complex conceptions of
reparation (beyond merely material compensation), and ensure
that women have a significant role in the distribution and
control of compensatory redress.65 The toolkits demonstrate two
things. First, a conceptual recognition of the need to bring
women into the frame of transitional societies across a range of
dimensions. Second, the requirement to address the absence of
women in meaningful and practical ways. Such outcomes are
valuable and we do not ignore them. Nonetheless, we remain
profoundly skeptical of the capacity of broader systematic
change without a radical reassessment of the implications of
existing mainstream approaches to conflict resolution and
governmental transitions.
III. THE RULE OF LAW & "DEAL-MAKING"
The real danger is that negotiations about the rule of law
function to obscure more important conversations. From a
gender perspective these imperative conversations need to
encompass the centrality of gender relations as the process of
transition is negotiated and agreed. It includes firmly placing
the private and public spaces in the same shared dialogue about
the role of law and legal institutions in mobilizing and
supporting a shift from violent politics. It may seem naive to
some to couch the important institutional and accountability
conversations in post-conflict and repression societies in the
frame of gendered social relations,6 6 but we argue for the long
view. Here, the real questions ought both to address long-term
social goals and to hold centrally the premise articulated by
Madhavi Sunder that law must enable women to obtain freedom
65. Id. at 37.
66. For example, Jeanne Gregory once noted that "[blecause women and racial
minority groups lag so far behind in basic freedoms, Marxists often dismiss them as
a kind of rearguard, whose demands detract from and slow down the main
revolutionary impetus." Jeanne Gregory, Sex Discrimination, Work and the Law, in
CAPITALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW: FROM DEVIANCY THEORY TO MARXISM 144 (Bob
Fine et al. eds., 1979).
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within their cultural and religious communities, rather than
from those communities.67
The absence of a gender dimension in the establishment,
revision, and operation of new legal and political institutions in
post-conflict and post-repression societies has been
acknowledged.68 The genealogy of institutional gaps for women
can be traced to omissions from peace-making and transitionary
"deal-making", thereby compounding the normative legal gaps
that facilitate further exclusions down the line. Exclusions are
aggravated across the three rule of law dimensions identified by
Carothers (laws, reform of legal institutions, and governance
including judiciary).69 Furthermore, in the pacted nature of
peace negotiations where 'nothing is agreed until everything is
agreed', rule of law initiatives can be rendered impotent by the
trade-offs that occur. In relation to the terms of amnesty
provisions for example, Donald Steinberg, Deputy President of
International Crisis Group and former US ambassador to
Angola, has argued that:
the [Angolan] peace accord [of November 1994] was based on thirteen
separate amnesties that excluded even the possibility of prosecution
for atrocities during the conflict ... including rape used as a weapon of
war.... these amnesties meant that men with guns forgave other men
with guns for crimes committed against women. This flaw undercut
any return to a culture of the rule of law and accountability.
70
However, additional exploration is required to assess why
women remain structurally excluded in the rule of law context,
and in particular why they remain excluded as the processes of
transition become increasingly internationalized.7' Part of the
rule of law movement extols as a virtue the international and
comparative dimension it brings to transitional societies. Such
internationalization, at least in theory, leads us to presuppose
that the outcomes will be better for women. Practice to date
67. See Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L. J. 1399, 1404 (2003).
68. Christine Bell, Colm Campbell & Fionnuala Ni Aoldin, Justice Discourses
in Transition, 13 SOC. & L. STUD. 305, 320-24 (2004).
69. Carothers, Rule of Law Revival, supra note 4, at 99-100.
70. FUNDACION PARA LAS RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES Y EL DIALOGO
EXTERIOR (FRIDE), JUSTICE FOR WOMEN: SEEKING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SEXUAL
CRIMES IN POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS 3 (Seminar Report, Brussels, May 13-14,
2008); see also U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Int'l Orgs., Hum. Rts. & Oversight, 110th Cong. 20 (2008) (statement of Donald
Steinberg, Deputy President, International Crisis Group).
71. These exclusions remain despite UN Security Council Resolutions 1325
(2000) and 1820 (2008). S.C. Res. 1325, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000); S.C.
Res. 1820, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1820 (June 19, 2008).
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suggests otherwise, and this article now summarily explores
part of that terrain.
A key element in the perceived success of many transitional
societies is the support of international organizations and other
guarantor or supporter states in making the triumph of legal
and political reform read as part of their own success or
failure.72 Tellingly, the "transitional moment" is usually only
one point on the continuum of a protracted legal and political
engagement between the transitional state and the
international community. The transitional state is captured
between the multiple interests of other states, their willingness
to articulate views about a regime or conflict, and the moments
of their formal or informal interaction with key actors at key
change moments. While much could be said about this complex
interaction in general, this analysis will focus on two particular
aspects: first, the relationship between the international
communities' previously articulated views on rule of law and
human rights compliance during a conflict or a period of
authoritarian rule; and second, the complex role that the
international community can play in compounding gender
inequality and unaccountability once entangled with a
transitional society.
First, many transitional societies have been the subject of
substantial international and bilateral state scrutiny prior to
any settlement. Transitioning societies have been repressive or
violent (or both), and international oversight may have "named
and shamed" systematic and significant human rights violations
in the pre-transition phase. When it comes time in the
settlement phase of a conflict or a regime handover, these prior
interventions are critical to framing the way in which
accountability is sought, articulated, and constructed. This
construction comes from intact western conceptions of human-
rights hierarchies and rule of law values imbued with their
inability to consider their own patriarchy and unwilling to
recognize it at work in an exported form.73 It is important
therefore to recognize the fact that the narrative constructed
72. E.g., High Commissioner's Office in Bosnia; the NATO-led Implementation
Force (IFOR) and Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia; Interim Authority in
Kosovo; and United Nations Transition Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).
73. Madeline Rees, International Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Cost
of Ignoring Gender, in THE POSTWAR MOMENT: MILITARIES, MASCULINITIES AND
INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING 51-57 (Cynthia Cockburn & Dubravka Zarkov eds.,
2002).
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about the nature and form of rule of law deficits in transitional
societies has as much to do with the demands for accountability
and rebuilding at the transitional moment as it has with the
prior narrative of causality and deficits. This narrative is
significantly constructed by the watchful and deeply involved
international community and interested states.
Second, Cockburn and Zarkov have argued "[t]hat the post-
conflict environment, like conflict, is vividly about male power
systems, struggles and identity formation."74 Moreover, there
may be an enormous flux in that male post-conflict fraternity
both on an individual and communal level. So, men who were in
power are losing power, other men are taking their place, and as
is often the case when a conflict stalemate arises, internationals
(generally culturally and politically differentiated "other" males)
are coming into a society to fill a vacuum. As Handrahan has
noted, this "international fraternity-the community of
decisionmakers and experts who arrive after a conflict on a
mission of 'good will'-holds the upper hand, morally,
economically and politically."75
However, while the international presence is lauded for
rescuing such societies from the worst of their own excesses,
what is little appreciated is that such men also bring with them
varying aspects of gender norms and patriarchal behavior that
transpose into the vacuum they fill.76 Moreover, despite an
array of cultural differences between locals and internationals,
what is frequently overlooked is the fundamentally similar
patriarchal views that internal and external elites share. These
operate in tandem to exclude, silence, or nullify women's needs
in the transitional space. As Cockburn and Zarkov's edited
collection explores, the loosening of rigid gender roles from the
social instability that conflict inevitably creates is not
necessarily sealed off at conflict's end or during transition by
national male leadership.77 Instead, the guardianship of social
74. POSTWAR MOMENT, supra note 73, at 99, cited in Lori Handrahan, Conflict,
Gender, Ethnicity and Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 35 SECURITY DIALOGUE 429, 433
(2004).
75. Handrahan, supra note 74, at 433 (citing POSTWAR MOMENT, supra note
73).
76. See Lesley Abdela, Kosovo - Missed Opportunities, Lessons for the Future,
13 DEV. IN PRAC. 208 (2003) (Report of the former Deputy-Director, NGO, Civil
Society Building for the OSCE Mission - Kosovo (1999)) (detailing the consistent
lack of integration of women and gender related issues into the planning of the
Interim Arrangements for Kosovo).
77. See generally POSTWAR MOMENT, supra note 73.
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stability is taken up by the male international development
community, "whose own sense of patriarchy-as-normal is quite
intact."" As such, the dangers of gender rights being co-opted
by (western) rule of law reformists include the abandonment of
gender interests to detached actors with little sense of their own
imported patriarchy.
As argued above, the public/private distinction sustains and
confirms women's oppression on a global level, but it is equally
part of the legal export between states and from internationals
and interested states to elites in transitioning states. Similarly,
gendered biases are implicitly carried into the rule of law
mantle. Across transitional societies, rule of law praxis reveals
copybook priorities: judicial reform, constitution writing,
legislative enactments, legal infrastructure, and security sector
reform. All in theory open up the possibility of gender
engagement-few if any deliver. Most tellingly, however, is
what gets left out. The high priorities generally sidestep
domestic violence (seen as unrelated to public and political
violence), legal inequalities (for example equal rights to property
ownership for men and women), religious law (and its
regulatory capacity in the private sphere), socio-economic
protections specific to care responsibilities, and meaningfully
mandated equal access to political representation.
Even in those transitional states where the rule of law
reforms have included a gendered dimension some telling
patterns emerge. The first is the gap between the rhetoric of
equality transformations and the lack of enforcement measures
on the ground. This under-enforcement problem for gender
equality has been identified in places as diverse as Northern
Ireland, South Africa, and Afghanistan.79 The site of the gap is
most evident as we measure the lag between the powerful
equality-driven rhetoric of transitional constitutions and their
subsequent interpretation and enforcement in specific contexts.
These constitutions may win prizes for their perceived
transformative content, but the measure of such effect rarely
involves a gender audit. Second, peace agreements often
contain gender equality language, driven by the requirements of
78. Handrahan, supra note 74, at 433; see also ARMS TO FIGHT, ARMS TO
PROTECT: WOMEN SPEAK OUT ABOUT CONFLICT (Bennett, Bexley &
Warnock eds., 1995).
79. Fionnuala Ni Aolin & Eilish Rooney, Underenforcement and
Intersectionality: Gendered Aspects of Transition for Women, 1 INT'L J.
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 338, 346, 348, 351 (2007).
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supra-national legal obligations under UN Security Council
Resolutions 1325 and 1820. Close examination of these
agreements reveals that gender inclusion lacks grounding which
might be achieved by linking provisions to specific mechanisms
of enforcement or measurements assessing success or failure."
Third, as transitions start and solidify, a worrisome pattern is
the virtual collapse of civil society supports and structures. This
results from a variety of causes: the pull of activists toward
government and ancillary institutions drawing them away from
grassroots organizations which are most supportive of the most
vulnerable; the withdrawal of international and bilateral
financial aid to civil society organizations because of donor
fatigue and the sense that the "war is over"; and the fatigue
factor for long-term activists that pulls them out of the public
arena of confrontation.8 These factors have been particularly
detrimental to women's organizations in a variety of post-
conflict and post-repression settings. By failing to view the
survival and strengthening of such grassroots structures as
integral to the success of the rule of law project itself and as
most likely to affect and involve women, the emphasis on other
rule of law priorities across all these dimensions negatively
affects any assessments of the gender/rule of law interface.
IV. CONCLUSION
We acknowledge that we raise more questions than we
provide answers. In so much as law constructs, defines, and
ascribes particular gendered roles, can the rule of law work to
supplant the rule of men? Can it ensure that politics redraws
the public/private map and facilitates greater deliberation about
gender roles? Can this occur during, and as part of, broader
political transition? Can the rule of law assist in deepening
democratic commitment to remedying gender-based harms and
challenging the legitimacy of entrenched or cliched gender roles?
Can the rule of law assist in providing, at once, autonomy and
community?
None of the answers are clear. But, there is virtue in
80. A telling example is the Northern Ireland Good Friday/Belfast Agreement
where the provision for greater inclusion of women in public life was uncoupled from
any specific mechanism to measure or support that outcome (e.g. quotas, party list
requirements, etc.).
81. Christine Bell & Johanna Keenan, Human Rights Nongovernmental
Organizations and the Problems of Transition, 26 HuM. RTS. Q. 330, 340-43 (2004).
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starting with a more circumspect view of the benefits that rule
of law brings for and to women in transitional societies. In
recognizing the corrosive effects that the legal production of
certain kinds of rules have for women in transitional societies,
we may, at least start to take remedial steps. The first of those
is grounded in slowing down the rule of law importers and
exporters. Pause and reflection may be the start of a more
thoughtful way forward where women seeking justice do not
merely get law. 2
82. See FUNDACI6N PARA LAS RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES Y EL DL4LOGO
EXTERIOR (FRIDE), supra note 70.
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